Global Forward Planning

The threat environment, the orbital commons, and the consequences of counterspace escalation are structurally global. Counterspace capabilities are proliferating globally, and escalation dynamics are inherently multinational, making the orbital environment a shared commons that no single nation can stabilize alone. International cooperation in crisis management may become increasingly difficult as other nations expand their efforts. International, cooperative planning can strengthen deterrence, distribute resilience, constrain adversary behavior, and reduce the risk of catastrophic miscalculation. 

A potential complication for all nations in creating protocols for resilience and deterrence in space is the increased risk from a disproportionate level of commercial entities. The U.S. favors integrating commercial assets and production into our national space programs, but this creates communication, coordination, and reconstitution vulnerabilities China and Europe models minimize. The U.S. percentage of space assets under direct government control is much less than China and Europe, possibly allowing competitors to develop mechanisms that provide better response to a space-related crisis as well as develop sovereign reconstitution capacities. If the U.S. continues its policy of heavy reliance on commercially owned assets, systems, and technology, greater contingency planning will be needed to manage any transition from space awareness to crisis management to conflict in space.

Aligning U.S. national space and counterspace planning with international efforts may increase U.S. resilience and deterrence and be an important factor in escalation management, which directly effects the investment risk and expected returns in the growing space economy. The proliferation of counterspace capabilities, critical commercial mega-constellations, and orbital congestion complicate an operating environment where determining adversarial actions and actors was always challenging. In the future, the U.S. will be even more limited in its ability to minimize global congestion and debris risks, effect international commercial norms, shape allies and partners space programs, and establish crisis response channels if solutions are not developed now.  Creating complimentary national and international planning for a Complex Space Operating Environment (CSOE) requires the U.S. to lead on:

· Roles and Responsibilities of Space Organizations and Policy: Increased integration and a coalition of willing international partners to foster cooperation, common solutions, bridging commercial and state capabilities, and fostering an environment that unleashes a global space economy. Clarity and transparency will be essential to protect systems and for crisis response.

· International Safe Space Preservation Priorities: Concrete steps to preserve the space operating environment as a safe, fair, and reusable resource for generations with agreements, discussions, and initiatives that avoid making autonomy and offensive operations the priority. There is progress on Space Situational Awareness (SSA) but limits to discerning the intent of damaging space events. 

· National and International Space Defense Parameters: Crisis communication, situational awareness, counterspace response mechanisms based on common norms and transparent operating parameters will be essential for creating a resilient space environment to defend, deter, and overcome adversarial actions that seek to deny the common use of space should be separate.

· Commercial Integration into Command and Control:In normal, crisis, and conflict operating environments the direction and management of space assets must be clear and in place prior to any event, whether accidental or intentional. Space investment dominated by commercial tech industries may create unaccountable downstream connections with hard to govern systemic risks.

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